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Given that disclosure is important for the efficient functioning of capital markets, this 
paper explores the impact of infringement of continuous disclosure by Australian 
listed firms. We observe a significantly negative market reaction for our sample firms 
around the day an infringement is announced. Our findings also provide partial 
evidence of an increase in spreads and a decrease in price informativeness following 
the announcement of a breach. Overall, our results indicate that the market considers 
the breach of continuous disclosure to be a relatively important incident.     
 
 
As recently as July 2013, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) stated that 
it views ‘continuous disclosure by listed companies as the bedrock of market integrity. It is 
essential to two of ASIC’s priorities: fair and efficient markets and confident and informed 
investors’ (Price 2013). In the same speech, the ASIC Commissioner also noted that perceptions 
of inequalities in access to information remain a concern for retail investors, with the potential 
to undermine investor confidence.  
Timely disclosure is recognised to be critical in maintaining the integrity of financial markets 
(Raykovski 2004) and improving investor confidence (Mayanja 2010). Financial market authorities 
have been entrusted to regulate corporate disclosure to ensure information is released to the market in 
a timely and accurate fashion. It has been argued, however, that requiring continuous disclose is 
insufficient without suitable enforcement measures (Ferrell 2004; Mayanja 2010). An enforcement 
action by stock exchange regulators, therefore, identifies a situation where a firm has failed in its 
obligation to keep the market fully informed. This breach of continuous disclosure also represents a 
situation where the informational efficiency of the market has most likely been harmed. An important 
question that arises from such a situation, and which has not sufficiently been examined, is how the 
market reacts to such a breach of disclosure rules.  
Australia represents an interesting setting within which to examine the impact of a breach of 
continuous disclosure. Australia introduced a very strict disclosure regime, incorporating both 
scheduled disclosures on a semi-annual basis and an ongoing requirement to disclose anything that 
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would be expected to have an impact on the stock price. However, while the Continuous Disclosure 
Regime (CDR) was legislated in 1994, questions were raised regarding the impact of the regulations, 
in part as a result of weak enforcement (Raykovski 2004). In response, in 2004, ASIC was given the 
power to issue infringement notices, with associated financial penalties, as an alternative remedy to 
the existing civil and criminal penalties. These notices give ASIC the ability to address less egregious 
CDR breaches in a more timely manner and without the expense of a court case. It has been argued 
that this change would enable ASIC to enforce CDR more efficiently without the significant legal 
hurdles of court proceedings. Since the regulatory change in 2004, ASIC has become more active in 
enforcing the CDR, with a number of infringement notices being issued. The active enforcement 
environment since 2004 creates a good setting within which to investigate the market impact of these 
alleged breaches.  
To date, research on the CDR in Australia has been limited, and has not addressed the market 
impact of infringement announcements. Brown, Taylor and Walter (1999) find an increase in total 
disclosure following the legislating of CDR in Australia, but the increase was limited to smaller 
firms with little analyst following, and for firms that are likely to report ‘bad’ news. Overall, 
their results show little support for the notion that the enactment has improved corporate 
disclosure. Chan et al. (2007) examine the effect of introducing continuous disclosure on 
management earnings forecasts. They find that the change in legislation and increased 
enforcement action by ASIC have has had a positive effect on management disclosures. Finally, 
Hsu (2009) examines the relationship between accounting earnings and the frequency of price-
sensitive disclosures in Australia. Hsu shows that firms facing earnings declines (bad news) have a 
higher frequency of disclosures than firms anticipating earnings increases (good news). The results 
suggest that despite the disclosure requirements of the CDR, firms still exercise considerable 
discretion around what they disclose.   
Our paper empirically investigates how the market reacts to the imposition of an infringement 
notice by ASIC for a breach of CDR between 2004 and June 2012. We identify a number of firms 
that have been issued with infringement notices within our sample period, a total of 19 firms; 
however, one firm is omitted from the sample as it was delisted shortly after the event date. Appendix 
A provides an overview of the firms included in our sample.1  
Background to the Continuous Disclosure Regime  
While Australia has had continuous disclosure rules written into the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) listing rules2 for decades, it was only included in the Corporations Act in 19943 
(Raykovski 2004). The law requires disclosure of security-related documents (prospectuses, 
investment statements, target statements and bidders’ statements), mandated semi-annual disclosure 
(interim financial reports, annual reports and accounts) and an ongoing requirement to immediately 
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disclose to the market any other material information. The requirement for continuous disclosure was 
included in the Corporations Act to allow for stricter enforcement, however, questions were raised 
regarding the enforcement by ASIC following the 1994 enactment. Desai and Ramsay (2011) argue 
that one issue impeding the efficient working of the CDR was the difficulty in enforcing the law prior 
to 2004.  
The Corporations Act, the principle source of penalties for a breach of the CDR, allowed ASIC 
to pursue either a criminal or civil case against the company. Prior to 2004, criminal penalties 
amounted to 200 penalty units or imprisonment for up to five years while civil penalties amounted to 
fines of up to $200,000. It was argued, however, that these processes were relatively slow and 
expensive, especially for minor infractions. As a result of reviews of the problems arising from the 
existing regulations, the Australian federal government enacted The Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (also known as CLERP 9), which 
strengthened the existing penalties and gave ASIC the ability to issue infringement notices.4  
Infringement notices are an administrative penalty issued directly by ASIC, fining the 
company,5 but they are not an admission of guilt by the company and do not allow for further court 
action (Raykovski 2004). Infringement notices were ultimately designed to allow for less serious 
breaches to be penalised. Since the introduction of the new regulation, ASIC has taken a hard line in 
enforcing the statute (Hsu 2009). However, considerable discretion remains within the rules as a result 
of legislated exemptions to the requirement to disclose information immediately, for instance where 
deals are incomplete. This is compounded by the fact that the requirement to disclose is adjudged on 
an objective basis, meaning incorrect interpretations of what needs to be continuously disclosed are 
still liable. As a result, ASIC and the ASX have both been active in working with companies to clarify 
the rules and provide ongoing detailed guidance as to how the rules are interpreted, such as the 
recently released ASX Guidance Note 8 (ASX 2013) and Continuous Disclosure: An Abridged Guide 
(ASX 2012b).  
One question regarding the CDR is whether the market actually reacts following an 
enforcement action. Does tightening up requirements by issuing infringement notices actually reflect 
negatively on a firm?  
Hypotheses and methodology  
The market reaction to a breach of the CDR will provide an indication of the market’s view of 
continuous disclosure and, in particular, if a breach increases the perception of firm risk. A breach 
suggests that a company has poor disclosure practices, making their stock prices less informative to 
investors, who may in turn consider investing in such a firm to be more risky. This is referred to as 
‘information risk’6 and has been modelled in the literature as an additional premium that investors 
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demand for bearing this risk component (Barry and Brown 1985 and1986; Merton 1987). If a breach 
of the CDR matters, we would observe the effects of this increased information risk in a number of 
areas. The most obvious consequence is that investors would require a higher return as compensation 
for the risk. This would result in a decrease in the share prices of firms on the day of the 
announcement of a breach. Our first hypothesis is: 
H1:  Abnormal returns will be negative following a breach of CDR  
To investigate the market reaction, we use the standard Brown and Warner (1985) event study 
methodology, with a pre-event period of 290 to 41 days to estimate our parameters. We calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over various windows around the day of a breach notice.  
We also investigate two additional variables that may be affected by an increase in information 
risk due to a breach of CDR, namely, trade execution costs and firm-specific risk. Trade execution 
costs, as measured by the bid-ask spread, are compensation for risks faced by liquidity providers, such 
as information asymmetry. Given a breach notice suggests an environment with more unpriced 
information, we would expect spreads to increase to cover the additional information risk (Welker 
1995; Bessembinder and Venkataraman 2009). We estimate the average percentage bid-ask spread 
using closing quotes and then average over our sample windows.  
H2: Firms spreads will increase following a breach of CDR 
We also consider the zero-return metric, proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999) and Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2006).7 The zero-return metric measures the amount of price-sensitive information 
entering the market, where a higher percentage of zero-return days (days considered to be without 
significant information or trading) indicates less informationally efficient share prices. We estimate 
the spreads and zero-return metric over three, six and 12-month windows both before (PRE) and after 
(POST) the issuance of an infringement notice, and test for statistical difference in the two sub-
periods.8 All data was collected from Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
H3: Firms specific information will be lower following a breach of CDR 
Findings  
Market reaction 
We find significant negative results around the announcement of an infringement notice over 
all the event windows considered. Specifically, we observe an n-3.69% return on the announcement 
day building to a return of -4.88% over the window (0, +3.)9 This suggests that the Australian market 
may have taken a few days to fully incorporate the breach into stock prices. Announcements of a 
breach of continuous disclosure are not frequently received by the market, therefore the under-
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reaction on the event day when compared to CARs over (0,+3) may be due to the difficulty in 
determining the implications of a breach and the extent of its impact on information risk. However, 
the delay may also be due to low trading volumes over the sample period for some sample firms, 
which may have slowed the market’s ability to impound the information of the breach into the price.   
 
Table 1 Here 
Trade execution costs 
Although we expected trading costs to increase as a result of the higher information risk 
demonstrated by an infringement notice, we see little conclusive evidence of this. Table 2 
demonstrates that spreads increase over all three windows. However, the t-test only indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level in the six- and 12-month POST period, and not at all for the 
three-month window.  
Table 2 Here 
Zero-return metric 
Likewise, we see little conclusive evidence that the percentage of zero-return days has changed 
significantly. In Table 2 we observe significance only for the six-month window, although again, all 
the results are in the expected direction. The lack of statistical significance for both spreads and the 
zero-return metric measures may be the result of the size of the sample.  
 
Conclusion 
The 2004 introduction of the infringement notice regime was in response to perceptions of 
weak enforcement of continuous disclosure, particularly for less serious breaches. The 
introduction of the infringement notice has given ASIC the ability to deal with breaches of 
continuous disclosure in a more timely and less expensive manner, ultimately allowing for 
greater enforcement. Our study demonstrates that investors in the market appear to value the 
more informationally efficient environment it promotes, as evidenced by the negative market 
reaction to the announcement of an infringement notice. This provides some support for the 
CDR in Australia. Notably, the infringement notices have served their purpose as enforcement is 
more common now; of the 19 breaches identified, all but two were infringement notices. Also, in 
support of comments made in a speech by the Commissioner of ASIC (Price 2013), we found 
few breaches of continuous disclosure in our sample period. This suggests that the market is 
broadly complying with the CDR regime and it would appear to suggest that the regime is 
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functioning well. It also provides support for the efforts of ASIC and the ASX in engaging 
actively with the market regarding the interpretation and application of the CDR.  
 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 Searches were conducted on the ASIC website, Factiva and other sources for notification of infringement 
notices. We took the announcement date as the first date where the details of the infringement notice were first 
disclosed.  
2 Listing Rule 3.1 (ASX 2012a).  
3 Previously covered by section s1001A prior to 2001 and s674 after 2001.  
4 Part 9.4AA of the Corporations Act.  
5 Penalties were set based on the size of the firm. For firms with a market capitalisation of less than $100 
million, the fine is $33,000. For firms between $100 million and $1 billion, the fine is $66,000 and for firms 
with a market capitalisation of greater than $1 billion the fine is $100,000 AUD (Corporations Act 2001,  
s1317DAE(6)). 
6 ‘Information risk’ is the risk borne by an investor relating to the possible non-disclosure of information (Barry 
and Brown 1986). 
7 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) conclude that ZR is a better measure for the level of firm-specific information 
and outperforms the traditional measure of price synchronicity (Morck et al. 2000). We have performed the 
latter analysis as well and do not obtain any significant results comparing pre-post breach event. 
8 To ensure the robustness of our results we investigated the potential for other confounding events within the 
period around the breach notice. With the exception of one company removed as it delisted soon after the event 
date, we found no announcements that we believed would impact our findings. More formal testing was not 
possible due to the sample size.  
9 To control for the impact of small firms and thin trading, we investigate just the seven firms making up the 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 firms (the larger firms). The findings remain consistent albeit with greatly reduced power.  
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APPENDIX:OVERVIEW OF SAMPLE COMPANIES 
 
Company Name Sector Type 
Date of 
announce
ment 
 Penalty ($) 
Astron  Materials Infringement 18-Jul-06 66,000 
Acuvax Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology 
& Life Sciences Infringement 8-Dec-06 33,000 
Avastra Sleep 
Centres 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology 
& Life Sciences Infringement 12-May-06 33,000 
BC Iron  Materials Infringement 1-Mar-12 66,000 
BioProspect  Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology 
& Life Sciences Infringement 8-Mar-12 33,000 
Centrex Metals  Materials Infringement 12-Mar-08 33,000 
Chemeq  Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology 
& Life Sciences Breach 24-Dec-04 500,000 
Citigold 
Corporation Materials Infringement 22-Sep-10 33,000 
Commonwealth 
BOA Banks Infringement 14-Oct-09 100,000 
Leighton Holdings Capital Goods Infringement 16-Mar-12 300,000 
Navigator 
Resources  Materials Infringement 15-Jun-12 33,000 
Nufarm  Materials Infringement 1-Dec-10 66,000 
Q Technology 
Group 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment Infringement 17-Feb-06 33,000 
Raw Capital 
Partners  Software and Services Infringement 1-Aug-07 33,000 
Rio Tinto  Materials Infringement 5-Jun-08 100,000 
FYI Resources Materials Infringement 1-Aug-05 33,000 
Sub-Sahara 
Resources NL Materials Infringement 29-Apr-08 33,000 
Fortescue Metals 
Group Materials Breach 3-Mar-06 
Ruling-no 
breach 
 
 
TABLE 1: Cumulative abnormal returns  
Window  CAAR    
-10, +10  -0.0229**    
-3, +3  -0.0335***    
-2, +2  -0.0321***    
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-1, +1  -0.0013*    
0, +1  -0.0274**    
0, +3  -0.0488***    
0  -0.0369***    
Note: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
. 
 
TABLE 2: Trade execution costs and zero return metrics (spread) 
        3 months 6 months  12 months     
 PRE POST  PRE POST  PRE POST  
Panel A: Trade Execution Costs 
Mean 0.0655 0.0768  0.0678 0.0809  0.0640 0.0974  
Median 0.0269 0.0292  0.0323 0.0289  0.0273 0.0346  
St Dev 0.1142 0.1491  0.1199 0.1386  0.1229 0.1750  
Min 0.0000 0.0000  0.0020 0.0000  0.0029 0.0017  
Max 0.4098 0.6233  0.4783 0.4876  0.5097 0.5578  
          
Mean Diff   0.0113   0.0131*   0.0335*  
t-test  (0.8661)   (1.4182)   (1.5000)  
          
Observations  18   18   17  
Panel B: Zero-Return Metrics 
Mean 0.3642 0.3898  0.3536 0.3955  0.3360 0.3404  
Median 0.2937 0.2698  0.2738 0.2421  0.2381 0.2500  
St Dev 0.3361 0.3755  0.3137 0.3670  0.2992 0.3203  
Min 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0079 0.0079  
Max 1.0000 1.0000  0.8968 1.0000  0.9127 0.9722  
          
Mean Diff   0.0256   0.0419**   0.0044  
t-test  (1.2941)   (2.1739)   (0.1885)  
          
Observations  18   18   17  
Note: Significance of the difference between PRE and POST samples is calculated using the matched-pairs t-
test for means and the Wilcoxon Mann Whitney signed-rank test for medians. PRE(POST) indicates either the 3, 
6 or 12 months before (after) the announcement of an infringement notice. * indicates significance at the 10% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
Ends 
 
<<sections marked in orange are potential breakout quotes>> 
